Michael S. Robinson v. Debra J. Robinson : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
Michael S. Robinson v. Debra J. Robinson : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stephen T. Hard; Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant.
Dean C. Andreasen; Sarah L. Campbell; Clyde Snow and Sessions; Attorneys for Respondent/
Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Robinson v. Robinson, No. 20090082 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1490
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL S. ROBINSON, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
DEBRA J. ROBINSON, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Case No. 20090082 
Trial Court No. 074900501 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE DEBRA J. ROBINSON 
APPEAL FROM A DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Stephen T. Hard (Bar No. 1359) 
4141 S. Highland Drive, Suite 220 
Holladay, Utah 84124 
Telephone: 801-918-2800 
Facsimile: 801-327-5565 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
Dean C. Andreasen (Bar No. 3981) 
Sarah L. Campbell (Bar No. 12052) 
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
Telephone: 801-322-2516 
Facsimile: 801-521-6280 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL S. ROBINSON, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
DEBRA J. ROBINSON, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Case No. 20090082 
Trial Court No. 074900501 
BRffiF OF APPELLEE DEBRA J. ROBINSON 
APPEAL FROM A DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Stephen T. Hard (Bar No. 1359) 
4141 S. Highland Drive, Suite 220 
Holladay, Utah 84124 
Telephone: 801-918-2800 
Facsimile: 801-327-5565 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
Dean C. Andreasen (Bar No. 3981) 
Sarah L. Campbell (Bar No. 12052) 
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2216 
Telephone: 801-322-2516 
Facsimile: 801-521-6280 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 3 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 3 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
NATURE OF THE CASE 4 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION AT TRIAL 5 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 7 
The Phoenix Plaza 8 
Negotiations and Mediation 8 
Mr. Robinson Breaches the Stipulation 10 
Commissioner's Findings 12 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 13 
ARGUMENT 14 
I. IT WAS APPROPRIATE FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO ACCEPT THE 
COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION BECAUSE A STIPULATION 
MADE IN ANTICIPATION OF DIVORCE SHOULD BE ENFORCED 
ABSENT FRAUD OR ANOTHER COMPELLING REASON 14 
a. Both parties had equal and ample opportunity to review relevant 
documents and consult with experts and advisors prior to signing the 
Stipulation 16 
b. Mr. Robinson's desire for a more favorable outcome does not rise to the 
level of impossibility in this case 19 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ACCEPTING 
THE PARTIES' STIPULATION OF FAIRNESS AS ITS FINDING OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSION THAT THE PROPERTY DIVISION AGREED TO WAS 
EQUITABLE 21 
m. AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS UNNECESSARY GIVEN THAT MR. 
ROBINSON HAD HIS OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD 25 
CONCLUSION 27 
ADDENDUM 30 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Arnellv. SaltLake County Bd. of Adjustment, 2005 UT App 165, 112 P.3d 1214........... 18 
Bayles v. Bayles, 1999 UT App 128, 981 P.2d 403 14 
Collins v. Collins, 1999 UT App 187 (unpublished) 17,20 
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 14,23 
Davis v. Davis, 2001 UT App 225,29 P.3d 676 22,27 
Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 582 P.2d 856 (Utah 1978) 19 
Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 113 (unpublished) 26 
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 14, 17, 24 
Naylorv. Naylor, 700 P.2d 707 (Utah 1985) 15 
Nunleyv. Nunley, 757 P.2d473 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 15 
Oneida/SLICv. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse Inc., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) 23 
Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, 984 P.2d 987 14,24 
Sill v. Sill, 2007 UT App 173, 164P.3d415 4, 15,24 
Stone v. Stone, 2008 UT App 154 (unpublished) 15, 24,25 
Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, 176 P.3d 476 3 
Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App 216, 138P.3d63 14, 15 
Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18,20 P.3d 332 15 
W. Props, v. S. Utah Aviation, Inc., 776 P.2d 656 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 20 
Wiscombev. Wiscombe, 744 P.2d 1024 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 26 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h) (2009) 3 
RULES 
Utah Appellate R. 24(a)(9) (2009) 22 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e) (2009) 24 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(g) (2009) 26 
Utah R. Judicial Admin. 6-401(2)(F) (2009) 24 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h) (2009) 
and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the 
Commissioner's recommendation and the parties' Stipulation and Property Settlement 
Agreement (the "Stipulation"), which was signed by both parties after consultation with 
their respective counsel and experts, as its basis for dividing the parties' property. The 
standard of appellate review for property distribution in a divorce action is abuse of 
discretion. Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, U 8, 176 P.3d 476. 
II. Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to revisit and 
rewrite the terms of the parties' Stipulation when enforcement of the Stipulation as 
written appeared fair and equitable on its face and the parties acknowledged in writing 
that the division of property represented a fair and equitable division. The standard of 
appellate review for property distribution in a divorce action is abuse of discretion. 
Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, H 8, 176 P.3d 476. 
III. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in overruling Mr. Robinson's objections 
to the Commissioner's recommendation and denying Mr. Robinson an evidentiary 
hearing when both parties had a full and fair opportunity to present evidence and 
testimony by way of affidavits and exhibits and these documents were reviewed before 
the ruling enforcing the parties' Stipulation. The standard of review for modification of a 
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divorce decree is abuse of discretion, but a determination based on a legal conclusion is 
reviewed for correctness. Sill v. Sill, 2007 UT App 173, f 8, 164 P.3d 415. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, or rules that are 
determinative of these issues. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal questions the abilities of parties in a divorce action to voluntarily enter 
into stipulations to divide marital property and then be bound by such an agreement once 
it has been incorporated into a decree of divorce. At the center of the dispute is a parcel 
of real property known as the Phoenix Plaza (the "Plaza")* a strip mall in Southern Utah 
which represents the parties' most significant asset. The parties negotiated directly and 
also participated in mediation with the goal of dividing their marital property and 
resolving all issues of their divorce action. Ultimately, the parties reached a stipulation 
that both were willing to sign. The Stipulation awarded the Plaza to Mr. Robinson and 
required him to refinance the mortgage encumbering the property and pay Ms. Robinson 
the amount of $1,784,419, representing her equity in the asset after certain offsets were 
taken into account. As is appropriate and customary, the trial court based its findings of 
facts and conclusions of law on the signed Stipulation, which the court found to be fair 
and equitable. 
4 
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Unhappy with the terms of the Stipulation after the fact, Mr. Robinson has claimed 
defenses to enforcement of the Stipulation, even though he himself breached the 
Stipulation within one month of its being made. Specifically, Mr. Robinson asserts that 
he was misled and that the assumptions underlying the parties' Stipulation were not met. 
In spite of Mr. Robinson's objections to a result which he chose (notably with the advice 
of experts and counsel), the trial court upheld the terms of the parties' Stipulation and 
entered its Decree of Divorce. Based on the evidence, and in an effort to achieve 
equitable distribution of the marital estate, the trial court properly adopted the 
Commissioner's recommendation and the Stipulation of the parties as its basis for 
dividing the marital estate. To do otherwise would disregard the agency and competency 
of individuals who, when represented by counsel and not under any type of duress, 
choose to bind themselves to contractual responsibilities and would unnecessarily open 
the door for the rescission of contracts for nothing more than hindsight. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial 
Ms. Robinson generally accepts Mr. Robinson's statement of the course of 
proceedings except for the statement in the second paragraph regarding the "obvious 
difficulties, if not impossibility, of Mr. Robinson being able to comply with the 
Stipulation," and makes the following additional statements and clarifications. 
On November 2, 2007, the parties successfully reached a resolution of their issues 
in mediation by which they distributed their properties and debts. (R. 115). The mediation 
was the culmination of ongoing settlement discussions throughout 2007. (R. 114). A 
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written Stipulation, which had already undergone several drafts, was signed at mediation 
and filed with the Court on November 6, 2007. (R. 14-28). On November 19, 2007, Ms. 
Robinson submitted the Decree of Divorce to the Court along with the necessary papers 
for entry. (R. 504). Ms. Robinson subsequently filed a Motion for Entry of Decree of 
Divorce. (R. 29-30). 
On February 12, 2008, Mr. Robinson filed a Motion to Enter Bifurcated Decree of 
Divorce and to Stay Entry of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Decree of Divorce and/or Set Aside Stipulation. (R. 38-88). On August 4, 2008, 
Mr. Robinson filed a second Motion to Set Aside Stipulation and Enter Bifurcated Decree 
of Divorce and an accompanying memorandum and declaration. (R. 95-190). 
On September 29,2008, Ms. Robinson filed a Supplemental Motion for Entry of 
Decree with an Affidavit and a Memorandum (i) in Opposition to Mr. Robinson's Motion 
to Set Aside Stipulation and Enter Bifurcated Decree of Divorce and (ii) in support of her 
motion for the Court to enter the Decree of Divorce. (R. 196-301). 
On October 6,2008, a hearing was conducted before Commissioner Michael S. 
Evans on Mr. Robinson's Motion to Set Asidd Stipulation and on Ms. Robinson's 
Supplemental Motion for Entry of Decree. (R. 320). After considering the proffers of 
evidence, arguments, and the papers filed in support and opposition to the motions, the 
Commissioner recommended that Mr. Robinson's Motion to Set Aside Stipulation be 
denied and that Ms. Robinson's Supplemental Motion for Entry of Decree be granted. (R. 
320,484-85). 
6 
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Ms. Robinson objected to the portion of the Commissioner's recommendation 
which denied her request for attorney's fees. (R. 321-36). Mr. Robinson did not timely 
file an objection to the Commissioner's recommendation, but rather requested an 
extension which was objected to by Ms. Robinson. (R. 337-42, 345-55). The Court 
ultimately granted Mr. Robinson's 6(b) Motion for Enlargement of Time. (R. 356-60). 
Thereafter, Mr. Robinson filed an Objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation and 
Request for Evidentiary Hearing and a supporting memorandum. (R. 361-474). 
On December 24, 2008, after reviewing the evidence as presented and a transcript 
of the prior hearing, Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki denied both parties' objections and affirmed 
the Commissioner's recommendation, finding no error or abuse of discretion. (R. 657-
59). On December 31,2008, the Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and the Decree of Divorce. (R. 660-75, 676-89). 
Statement of the Facts 
The parties married on October 4, 1992. (R. 661). Mr. Robinson filed a petition for 
divorce on February 2, 2007. (R. 1-5). Mr. Robinson is a sophisticated investor who 
purchased many investment properties before and during his marriage to Ms. Robinson. 
(R. 197). 
During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired numerous parcels of 
income-producing real property including condominiums, vacant land, and two strip 
malls. (R. 15,113). The parties divided the marital estate pursuant to a signed Stipulation 
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arrived at after substantial negotiations and a formal mediation—all of which occurred 
while both parties were represented by counsel. (R. 662-66). 
The Phoenix Plaza 
Located in St. George, Utah, the Phoenix Plaza is a strip mall that the parties 
purchased in 2004. (R. 113, 198). The Plaza, in which space is leased to numerous 
commercial tenants, has provided the main source of income for the parties during the 
course of their marriage. (R. 114, 456). While Ms. Robinson has primarily provided the 
bookkeeping services associated with the Plaza, Mr. Robinson "has had continuing 
access to all the information regarding the financial status of the Plaza" including value, 
monthly income, and expenditures. (R. 198, 646). Additionally, Mr. Robinson has had 
original copies of all tenant leases on his computer showing when they were set to expire. 
(R. 647). 
Negotiations and Mediation 
During much of 2007, the parties engaged in direct negotiations and drafted 
agreements with the intention of dividing their marital property. (R. 114). On November 
2, 2007, the parties participated in a mediation session with Karin Hobbs at which they 
finalized a stipulation intended to settle all issues of the divorce action. (R. 115, 197, 
660). Both parties were represented by counsel at the mediation. (R. 115). Both parties 
had the opportunity to and, in fact, did consult with financial advisors and experts 
regarding the terms of the Stipulation. (R. 199). During the mediation, Mr. Robinson 
specifically made phone calls to his accountant and real estate broker verifying the value 
8 
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of the Phoenix Plaza. (R. 199). The parties stipulated to a value for the Plaza of $7.25 
million although the parties never agreed on the underlying elements for arriving at that 
figure. (R. 115, 199-200). Mr. and Ms. Robinson signed the Stipulation the day of the 
mediation. (R. 26-27). 
Pursuant to the parties' Stipulation, the Phoenix Plaza was awarded to Mr. 
Robinson on the condition that he (1) refinance the mortgage encumbering the Plaza and 
(2) pay Ms. Robinson the amount of $1,784,419 for her equity in the Plaza plus and 
minus certain offsets. (R. 664). The Stipulation expressly stated that Mr. Robinson had to 
submit the application to refinance the mortgage within fifteen days of signing the 
Stipulation. (R. 665). A rate of eight percent interest was to accrue on the unpaid 
principal if the refinancing had not occurred within 120 days of the parties having signed 
the Stipulation. (R. 665). 
The parties' Stipulation was not solely the result of a one-day mediation session. 
Rather, the parties engaged in extensive discussions and negotiations about how to 
distribute their property throughout much of 2007. (R. 114). Moreover, a few days prior 
to mediation, the parties—at the initiation of Mr. Robinson—met with their accountant, 
Steven Shields, and discussed the financial consequences of refinancing the Phoenix 
Plaza. (R. 198). At this meeting, Ms. Robinson had no documentation with her besides a 
common area maintenance statement showing 2006 expenses, which she used, along with 
other assumptions, to prepare a handwritten financial analysis of the Plaza. (R. 199,401). 
The analysis Ms. Robinson created and provided to Mr. Robinson was "a rough, hastily 
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constructed, estimated worksheet" provided only for the purpose of illustration and was 
not incorporated into the parties' Stipulation. (R. 199,14-28). Mr. Robinson did not rely 
on the document which he now claims was a misrepresentation. (R. 199). In fact, he 
consulted with his accountant, and they both concluded that the income as represented on 
Ms. Robinson's handwritten worksheet was overstated. (R. 199). 
Although Mr. Robinson has alleged that he was misled regarding the Plaza's 
leasehold status, he had knowledge in October 2007 that several leases were expired or 
expiring and being renegotiated. (R. 201,248). Furthermore, the Plaza was fully occupied 
on the day of mediation, a fact which Mr. Robinson acknowledged through a summary he 
prepared. (R. 201, 456). The first vacancy occurred thereafter in March 2008. (R. 201). 
Currently, the Plaza has only three vacancies. (R. 209). 
Mr. Robinson Breaches the Stipulation 
According to the terms of the Stipulation reached during mediation, Mr. Robinson 
should have filled out an application to refinance the mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza on 
or before November 17, 2007—fifteen days from the signing of the Stipulation. (R. 18-
19). He did not and has not refinanced the mortgage on the Plaza in spite of opportunities 
to do so. (R. 203, 253). Despite encouragement from commercial loan broker John 
Gottschall to not speculate about interest rates and to lock in loan terms, Mr. Robinson 
refused to complete a loan application in November 2007. (R. 253). Moreover, he did not 
submit a loan application until January 17, 2008. (R. 147-61). 
10 
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In contrast, Ms. Robinson has been cooperative in attempting to assist Mr. 
Robinson to refinance the mortgage. (R. 208). For example, on the first business day 
following mediation, Ms. Robinson contacted the parties' commercial mortgage broker 
and got loan quotes, which she promptly forwarded to Mr. Robinson. (R, 203,253). 
Mr. Robinson's delays in submitting a loan application and attempts to set aside 
the parties' Stipulation are nothing more than his attempt to renegotiate the terms of the 
parties' Stipulation related to the Phoenix Plaza, an effort he commenced almost 
immediately after the conclusion of the mediation. (R. 197-98, 241). He was looking for 
narrow, ideal terms of a loan while overlooking viable options as confirmed by John 
Gottschall (R. 205, 209, 253-54). Specifically, Mr. Robinson wanted nothing less than a 
twenty-year term and a twenty-year amortization, as he expressed in a conversation with 
Ms. Robinson. (R. 203). Following mediation, Mr. Robinson also tried to renegotiate 
items such as security deposits and a new roof on the Plaza. (R. 203). 
The first time Mr. Robinson requested any financial information from Ms. 
Robinson to facilitate an actual loan was February 1,2008—more than two months after 
he should have applied for a loan refinance on the Plaza. (R. 206). Even so, Mr. 
Robinson's attorney alleged that Ms. Robinson failed to provide information required for 
the loan application. (R. 206, 461-62). 
In truth, Ms. Robinson was unable to "assist Petitioner in preparing and filing the 
loan refinance application" as agreed to in the Stipulation because of Mr. Robinson's own 
failure to forward to Ms. Robinson necessary information regarding rent deposits and 
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Plaza supplier bills—information to which Mr. Robinson alone had access. (R. 19,206-
07). Ms. Robinson could not "provide financial statements or other reports until [Mr. 
Robinson] sen[t] [her] the underlying source documents." (R. 208). She did not receive 
this information from Mr. Robinson until February 2008. (R. 207). Thus, she could not 
have prepared any type of report or financial statement until February 2008. In spite of 
Ms. Robinson's inability to compile information she had not yet received from Mr. 
Robinson, Mr. Robinson requested from her year-to-date financial information on the 
Plaza in mid-December. Ironically, this was already one month after the loan application 
should have been submitted and was not the result of a lender request. (R. 205). 
Commissioner's Findings 
At a hearing on May 6, 2008, Commissioner Michael S. Evans found that "at the 
time [the Stipulation was signed], it's clear to me that the deal was reached in fair 
fashion, and it represented the parties' agreement at the time[.]" (R. 491). He also found 
that throughout the parties' negotiations, Ms. Robinson did not engage in fraudulent or 
deceptive behavior. (R. 491). According to the transcript of the Commissioner's ruling at 
the hearing: 
Mr. Robinson chose freely and voluntarily and with the advice of counsel 
and others to enter into the terms of this Agreement. To the verbal extent he 
relied upon Ms. Robinson's handwritten analysis or any other verbal 
representations that she made, Mr. Robinson chose to rely upon those 
representations and he chose not to include any of those representations in 
the Settlement Agreement, to make any reference to them whatsoever, or to 
include them as pre-conditions. 
(R.491). 
12 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The law recognizes the right of individuals to enter into contracts and craft their 
own legal agreements, especially in the specific case of divorce. Consequently, trial 
courts should be extremely hesitant to substitute their own judgment for that of the 
parties, who are more familiar with their individual situations than any judge could ever 
hope to be. In divorce proceedings, courts have broad discretion in dividing marital 
property—discretion which allows them to adopt parties' stipulations as their findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. While it is certainly possible for courts to reject or revise the 
terms of a stipulation and property settlement agreement in limited circumstances, it is 
both customary and appropriate to base a final decree of divorce on a stipulation of 
parties. The case law is clear that a divorce stipulation should be adopted and enforced as 
the order of the court except in extremely limited circumstances. To hold otherwise 
would discourage settlement and undermine the effect of contracts. 
Another element of the discretion given to trial courts in divorce proceedings is 
that evidentiary hearings are allowed but not required. Instead, evidence is presented in 
the form of affidavits and other papers, including written stipulations. The trial court in 
this case relied on the evidence before it to make sufficient findings upon which its 
property distribution was based. The court should not disturb the trial court's decision, 
which achieved an equitable result. 
There is nothing unique about the facts of this case that warrant any type of relief 
for Mr. Robinson. Because he voluntarily signed the parties' Stipulation and then 
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breached his responsibilities thereunder, he may not now claim defenses of mistake and 
impossibility. With the benefit of legal counsel, the parties carefully negotiated and 
crafted an agreement, which they both were willing to sign. Accordingly, the court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Robinson's objection and enforcing the 
Stipulation of the parties as the order of the court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. IT WAS APPROPRIATE FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO ACCEPT THE 
COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION BECAUSE A 
STIPULATION MADE IN ANTICIPATION OF DIVORCE SHOULD 
BE ENFORCED ABSENT FRAUD OR ANOTHER COMPELLING 
REASON. 
Under Utah law, a stipulation reached by divorcing spouses regarding property 
division should be recognized and enforced by the courts. Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App 
216, If 3, 138 P.3d 63 (noting that spouses have general authority "to arrange property 
rights by contract." (quoting Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, f 24, 984 P.2d 987)); Bayles v. 
Bayles, 1999 UT App 128, 981 P.2d 403 ("Stipulations entered into in contemplation of a 
divorce 'are conclusive and binding on the parties unless, upon timely notice and for 
good cause shown, relief is granted therefrom.'" (quoting Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 
403, 406 (Utah Ct. App. 1990))); Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(stating that "a parties' stipulation as to property rights in a divorce action [is] advisory 
and usually followed"). 
"[P]arties to litigation are free—indeed encouraged—to stipulate to the resolution 
of their disputes and, when they do so, the courts of this state will enforce those 
14 
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agreements as written and will not paternalistically substitute their judgment for that of 
the parties." Sill v. Sill, 2007 UT App 173, f 23, 164 P.3d 415 (J. Orme, concurring). 
Accordingly, when a party agrees to sign a settlement, he or she "waive[s] the right to 
claim that such agreement should contain additional or different terms." Stone v. Stone, 
2008 UT App 154, at * 1 (unpublished). 
Admittedly, courts have discretion to reject or set aside settlement agreements. See 
Nunley v. Nunley, 757 P.2d 473, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (finding "no abuse of 
discretion in the court's rejection of the settlement agreement as being inequitable"). Yet, 
the exceptions are few to the general rule that courts enforce stipulations as written. See 
e.g., Sill v. Sill, 2007 UT App 173, f 12, 164 P.3d 415 (noting that waivers of alimony 
and child support in stipulations are only recommendations and can be disregarded by the 
court); Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App 216, 138 P.3d 63 (emphasizing the deference given 
to divorce stipulations absent fraud or duress); Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, *J 27,20 
P.3d 332 (stating that a court has "discretion to set aside [a] stipulation if it was based on 
erroneous assumptions that could affect the rights of parties who had not participated in 
the stipulation."). One situation in which courts may disregard a stipulation is where child 
support or alimony is improperly curtailed. Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d 707 (Utah 1985). 
Legislators who enacted the law were probably aware of a fact, which is a 
matter of common knowledge to trial courts, that parties to divorce suits 
frequently enter into agreements relative to alimony or for child support 
which, if binding upon the courts, would leave children or divorced wives 
inadequately provided for. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the law 
was intended to give the courts power to disregard the stipulations or 
agreement of the parties in the first instance and enter judgment for such 
15 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
alimony or child support as appears reasonable, and to thereafter modify 
such judgments when change of circumstances justifies it, regardless of 
attempts of the parties to control the matter by contract 
Id. at 709-10 (emphasis in original) (quoting Callister v. Callister, 261 P.2d 944, 948-49 
(Utah 1953)). 
In this case, Mr. and Ms. Robinson crafted and signed a Stipulation to resolve all 
issues pertaining to their divorce, including the ownership of and obligations related to 
the Phoenix Plaza. (R. 115-16, 197, 660). The parties had authority to reach this 
Stipulation and the trial court had discretion to adopt and enforce the Stipulation between 
the parties. While the trial court could have rejected the parties' Stipulation as 
inequitable, it chose instead to enforce the Stipulation's terms. (R. 657-89). In other 
words, none of the narrow exceptions to the general rule were found to apply. First, both 
parties actively participated in the extensive negotiations conducted prior to mediation, 
and both parties actively participated in the mediation and were present for the drafting 
and signing of the Stipulation. (R. 26-27, 115, 197, 199). Second, the disputed provisions 
of the Stipulation had no bearing on any ongoing child support or alimony obligation. (R. 
14-28). Moreover, Mr. Robinson has at no time alleged that he signed the Stipulation as 
the result of fraud or duress on the part of Ms. Robinson. (R. 38-85, 112-90, 644-51). In 
short, it was entirely within the trial court's discretion to accept the Commissioner's 
recommendation and enforce the parties' Stipulation as written. 
a. Both parties had equal and ample opportunity to review relevant 
documents and consult with experts and advisors prior to signing 
the Stipulation. 
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The primary thrust of Mr. Robinson's argument that his performance under the 
Stipulation should be excused and the parties' assets reallocated is mutual mistake. 
(Appellant Brief 4-5, 14, 19-20, 22-25). He asserts that both parties made false 
assumptions in contemplation of the Stipulation—specifically regarding the value of the 
Plaza, its future income, and its continued occupancy. (Appellant Brief 23). Interestingly, 
Ms. Robinson has at no time maintained that she made a mistake when she signed the 
parties' Stipulation. (R. 31-33, 196-284). Thus, at best there could only be a unilateral 
mistake, not a mutual mistake. 
While it is possible to set aside a stipulation or contract on the basis of mistake, 
"[a] party cannot avoid a divorce decree simply by 'claiming a mistake in entering into 
the stipulation5 on appeal." Collins v. Collins, 1999 UT App 187, at *1 (unpublished) 
(quoting Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). It would be 
especially rare for a court to set aside a stipulation where the party claiming the mistake 
is a sophisticated investor who had legal representation during the entire course of the 
relevant negotiations. See Collins v. Collins, 1999 UT App 187 (unpublished) (finding 
stipulation binding where wife was represented by counsel and took an active part in the 
negotiations); Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403,406 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (finding 
stipulation binding even where a mistake existed). To provide a successful defense, the 
alleged mistake must be one of present facts, not future unknowns. 
It is well settled that a contract is voidable if there is a mutual mistake of 
fact. However, there can be no mutual mistake as to an event which is to 
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occur in the future. This rule is justified because 'a contract often functions 
primarily to insulate the parties from uncertainty and to allocate the risk of 
future events.5 
Arnell v. Salt Lake County Bd of Adjustment, 2005 UT App 165,1j 41, 112 P.3d 1214 
(differentiating between failure of expectation and mutual mistake of material fact) 
(citations omitted). 
Mr. Robinson has not cited any case law where a mistake provided sufficient 
grounds for not enforcing a divorce stipulation. The fact that the parties were both 
represented by counsel and had the opportunity to review their Stipulation and consult 
with legal and financial advisors makes this case distinguishable from the cases cited by 
Mr. Robinson where non-divorce contracts were found unenforceable on the basis of 
mistake. (R. 115,199). 
As noted earlier, Mr. Robinson did not rely solely on representations from his wife 
when he chose to sign the Stipulation which formed the basis for the parties' Decree of 
Divorce. Rather, he consulted with his counsel, accountant, and real estate broker. (R. 
199). He relied on his prior experience as a real estate investor and businessman. (R. 
197). And given the fact that the parties were in the middle of a divorce, he exercised a 
healthy degree of skepticism and disbelief, questioning the information provided by Ms. 
Robinson. (R. 199). 
When the parties entered into their Stipulation, neither could foresee nor control 
the economic downturn of 2008 and how that economy would impact the vacancies and 
value of the Phoenix Plaza. (R. 366). In fact, in November 2007, the parties—after 
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considering all the data they chose to review—stipulated to the compromised value for 
the Plaza of $7.25 million. (R. 18,24). Mr. Robinson undoubtedly concluded that the 
leases were secure enough to enter into the Stipulation. (R. 201, 248, 456). Only later, 
after the passage of time and further investigation by Mr. Robinson, did the terms of the 
Stipulation begin to appear more favorable to Ms. Robinson. Yet, the changes in the 
Plaza's net income and tenancies were not a result of Ms. Robinson's surreptitious 
behavior. (R. 491). Nor was Mr. Robinson denied access to any information he deemed 
necessary to review prior to his signing of the Stipulation. (R. 198, 646, 671). The facts 
about which Mr. Robinson alleges to have been misled did not exist at the time the 
parties signed the Stipulation. Thus, there was necessarily no mistake of fact and thereby 
no sufficient reason for dismissing Mr. Robinson's obligations as outlined in the 
Stipulation. 
b. Mr. Robinson's desire for a more favorable outcome does not rise to 
the level of impossibility in this case. 
Mr. Robinson has also argued that he should be relieved of his contractual 
obligations based on the doctrine of impossibility. "The doctrine of impossibility of 
performance is one by which a party may be relieved of performing an obligation under a 
contract where supervening events, unforeseeable at the time the contract is made, render 
performance of the contract impossible." Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 582 P.2d 
856, 861 (Utah 1978). The party invoking the defense of impossibility must be without 
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fault and cannot have foreseen the event which made performance of the obligation 
impossible. W. Props, v. S. Utah Aviation, Inc., 776 P.2d 656, 658 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Additionally, courts are hesitant to undo contracts simply because one party claims 
to have been misinformed or has experienced regret. See id (concluding that a defendant 
was "bound by the sublease, regardless of whether he read or understood the full import 
of what he signed."). As stated by the Utah Court of Appeals, 
a signatory cannot, with hindsight, claim ignorance of the contract and 
thereby escape liability. 'One party to a contract does not have a duty to 
ensure that the other has a complete and accurate understanding of all terms 
embodied in a written contract. Each party has the burden to understand the 
terms of a contract before he affixes his signature to it and may not 
thereafter assert his ignorance as a defense.' 
Id. (quoting Resource Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1047 
(Utah 1985)). Courts "will not disturb a stipulation negotiated and voluntarily entered 
simply because a party has come to regret the bargain made." Collins v. Collins, 1999 UT 
App 187, at * 1 (unpublished). 
In this case it is undisputed that Mr. Robinson did not submit a loan refinance 
application within the requisite time period under the Stipulation. (R. 117, 203, 253, 646). 
Therefore, Mr. Robinson breached his obligations by not securing the loan as he agreed 
to do. It is irrelevant to speculate what loan terms may or may not have been possible 
given the benefit of hindsight. The simple fact is that Mr. Robinson did not live up to his 
part of the contract. Therefore, it would be inequitable for this Court to allow him to now 
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find protection under the defense of impossibility. Moreover, no evidence has been 
presented that it remains impossible for Mr. Robinson to refinance the mortgage. 
The known, volatility and uncertainty of the credit market is another fact that 
prevents Mr. Robinson from invoking the defense of impossibility. It was entirely 
foreseeable to both parties that the credit market does and will change over time. 
Although the parties stipulated to a value of the Plaza, this assumption was just that—an 
assumption which the parties chose to rely on when they entered into their Stipulation. 
The value of the Plaza was not established as a condition precedent for Mr, Robinson's 
duties. (R. 14-28). The parties could have implemented a formula to determine the 
amount Mr. Robinson would be obligated to pay Ms. Robinson; for example, one half of 
the value of the Plaza once it was established by appraisal. But this the parties did not do. 
Instead, the parties inserted a specific value which would be paid to Ms. Robinson. (R. 
18). That is the Stipulation that both parties signed. Thus, the court did not abuse its 
discretion when it adopted the parties' Stipulation as its basis for dividing the marital 
property in this case because neither mistake nor impossibility fit as a defense given the 
facts before the court. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ACCEPTING THE PARTIES' STIPULATION OF FAIRNESS AS ITS 
FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSION THAT THE PROPERTY 
DIVISION AGREED TO WAS EQUITABLE. 
It is unnecessary for a judge to enter findings about mutual mistake and 
impossibility when the evidence before the court supports the conclusion that a particular 
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property division is equitable. In this case, the parties' Stipulation negated the need for 
such additional findings. 
[A stipulation] has all the binding effect of findings of fact and conclusions 
of law made by the court upon the evidence. The rationale is that the 
stipulation constitutes an agreement of the parties that all the facts 
necessary to support i t . . . pre-existed and would be sustained by available 
evidence, had not the agreement of the parties dispensed with the taking of 
evidence. 
Davis v. Davis, 2001 UT App 225, \ 10,29 P.3d 676 (quoting United Factors v. T.C 
Assocs., Inc., 445 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1968)). 
In examining the parties' Stipulation, paragraph 50 states: "The parties represent 
that prior to the execution of this Agreement they have each reviewed and discussed its 
terms with their respective counsel, if deemed necessary, and that the same represents a 
fair and equitable distribution of the assets acquired and liabilities incurred by the 
parties." (R. 24) (emphasis added). This paragraph has no language that the fairness 
achieved by the Stipulation is in any way premised on the value of the Phoenix Plaza. 
Nor is the equitable distribution conditioned on specific vacancy rates or income levels. 
Because the above provision is contained in the Stipulation, it carries the force of 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Davis v. Davis, 2001 UT App 225, f 10,29 P.3d 
676. Regardless, the court made an independent finding of fairness as expressed in 
paragraph 49 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to which Judge Iwasaki 
affixed his signature on December 31, 2008. (R. 671-72) ("The Court finds that [the 
property division]... represents a fair and equitable distribution of the assets and 
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liabilities incurred by the parties."). If Mr. Robinson wishes to challenge this finding, he 
bears the heightened burden of marshalling the evidence, which he has not done. See 
Utah Appellate R. 24(a)(9) (2009) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal 
all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."); Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold 
Storage & Warehouse Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("To 
successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's 
advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume 
the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the marshalling duty... the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists."5 
(quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991))). 
It is important to note that under Utah law, equitable does not mean the same thing 
as equal. Just because a property distribution is not "mathematically equal is not 
sufficient grounds to constitute an abuse of discretion, since a fair and equitable 
distribution is not necessarily an equal distribution." Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 
789 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Mr. Robinson has misstated the law with his assertion that divorce stipulations 
"are not enforceable unless the court determines that the substantive terms are fair and 
reasonable." (Appellant Brief 25). In fact, the reverse is true. Stipulations are generally 
enforceable except for rare circumstances such as those involving fraud or lack of 
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representation. See supra I. It is customary for a trial judge to adopt party stipulations and 
incorporate the stipulation into findings of fact and a decree of divorce. See e.g., Sill v. 
Sill, 2007 UT App 173, f 4, 164 P.3d 415 ("The trial court approved the Agreement and 
incorporated its provisions in the parties March 2001 divorce decree"); Maxwell v. 
Maxwell 796 P.2d 403, 404 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("Otis and Betty were divorced by 
decree of divorce entered pursuant to a stipulation executed by the parties."). Further, the 
signing of a property settlement acts as a waiver of any additional terms, Stone v. Stone, 
2008 UT App 154, at * 1 (unpublished), and trial courts "should be reluctant to overturn 
parties' specific and knowing waivers in agreements governing both property rights and 
alimony." Sill v. Sill, 2007 UT App 173, \ 18, 164 P.3d 415. The court is certainly not 
required io revisit issues already resolved by way of stipulation. Utah courts have 
repeatedly upheld the principle that "spouses or prospective spouses may make binding 
contracts with each other and arrange their affairs as they see fit, insofar as the 
negotiations are conducted in good faith[.]" Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, If 25, 984 P.2d 
987. 
In this case, the parties voluntarily entered into and signed the Stipulation. (R. 26-
27, 491). The Stipulation was intended to settle all issues of the divorce. (R. 115, 660). 
There was no fraud or duress. Both parties were represented by counsel. (R. 115). Both 
parties examined documents, consulted with advisors, and consulted with counsel. (R. 24, 
199, 671). In sum, each chose to be bound by the terms of the Stipulation. When each 
party signed the Stipulation, he or she waived the right to additional or different terms. 
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Stone v. Stone, 2008 UT App 154, at * 1 (unpublished). As a sophisticated and 
experienced real estate investor, Mr. Robinson knew what he was doing and was not 
improperly coerced. (R. 197). Accordingly, the court was required to and did exercise 
reluctance in amending the terms of the Stipulation. 
The trial court's decision to deny Mr. Robinson's objection and to enforce the 
terms of the parties' Stipulation is entirely reasonable. Here, the trial court considered the 
evidence and determined that the result of the Stipulation—although different than Mr. 
Robinson's expectations—was, all things considered, equitable. (R. 671). Although the 
value of the Plaza may have decreased due to Mr. Robinson's delay in refinancing and 
although certain tenants may not have resigned leases as had been anticipated, the law 
allows for one spouse to receive more marital property than another where, as in this 
case, the overall outcome is equitable and the parties entered their Stipulation in good 
faith. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
III. AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS UNNECESSARY GIVEN THAT MR. 
ROBINSON HAD HIS OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. 
Court commissioners have authority and discretion to conduct evidentiary 
hearings but are not required to do so. See Utah R. Judicial Admin. 6-401(2)(F) (2009) 
(noting that evidentiary hearings are conducted "[a]t the commissioner's discretion"). 
Judges also have discretion to hold hearings, but the court did not have to grant Mr. 
Robinson an evidentiary hearing given the facts of this case. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e) 
(2009) (stating that the court "may hold a hearing on any motion"). Even were the motion 
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considered dispositive of the divorce case, which would mandate a hearing, "the issue of 
[property division] ha[d] been authoritatively decided" and thus no hearing was required. 
Id. 
Mr. Robinson would have this Court believe that denial of an evidentiary hearing 
is synonymous with a denial of due process rights, yet he cites only one case for this 
proposition, which is distinguishable from the facts of the instant case. {See Appellant 
Brief III). Likewise, Mr. Robinson has cited no case law support for his assertion that the 
judge's acceptance of the Commissioner's recommendation "was a denial of Michael's 
due process rights." (Appellant Brief 29). 
Although due process requires "the opportunity to be fully heardf,]" the Wiscombe 
case does not stand for the proposition that an evidentiary hearing before a court 
commissioner is always necessary. See Wiscombe v. Wiscombe, 1AA P.2d 1024 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) (noting that a full evidentiary hearing should have been provided in a case 
where defendant failed to notify the commissioner and opposing counsel of his objection 
and there was a dispute about compliance with a rule). In fact, it is customary for 
hearings before court commissioners to be based on written pleadings and proffers. Id. 
According to the express language of rule 7(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, courts are not obligated to hold an evidentiary hearing when a party has 
objected to the recommendation of a court commissioner. See Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 
UT App 113, at * 1, n. 1 (unpublished) ("[T]here is nothing in rule 7(g) . . . that requires a 
district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing before ruling on an objection to a 
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commissioner's recommendation."). Rather, the objecting party is given the opportunity 
to "object to the recommendation by filing an objection in the same manner as filing a 
motion within ten days after the recommendation is made in open court or, if the court 
commissioner takes the matter under advisement, ten days after the minute entry of the 
recommendation is served." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(g) (2009). 
In this case, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary and would be a waste of judicial 
resources. Both parties had the opportunity to submit evidence in the form of affidavits 
and legal memoranda. The evidence which Mr. Robinson has presented to the court for 
appellate review is essentially the same evidence he proffered to the Commissioner and 
upon which the Commissioner's recommendation was made. Mr. Robinson has failed to 
establish why an evidentiary hearing is necessary. Further, the parties' Stipulation does 
away with the need for evidence. See Davis v. Davis, 2001 UT App 225,1f 10, 29 P3d 
676 (stating that "the agreement of the parties dispensed with the taking of evidence."). 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court was well within its discretion and committed no error by 
incorporating the parties' Stipulation into the Decree of Divorce, Both parties had a full 
and fair opportunity to review documents and consult with advisors before signing the 
Stipulation. In fact, each party did. Additionally, both parties were represented by counsel 
during the course of their negotiations and mediation session. Mr. Robinson is the only 
person claiming a mistake was made; therefore, there can be no mutual mistake. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that it was or is impossible for Mr. Robinson to 
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perform his duties under the Stipulation because he did nothing to carry out his duties 
until the time frame for compliance had passed. Mr. Robinson's procrastination and 
attempts to renegotiate the parties' Stipulation is no reason to excuse his performance. 
Finally, no evidentiary hearing is required because the court has already entered a finding 
that the property distribution was fair and equitable, and the parties waived their right to 
revise the terms of their Stipulation when each affixed their signature to the document. 
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Dated this HTA day of October 2009. 
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN 
SARAH L. CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee 
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I hereby certify that on the /VZ( day of October, 2009, two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE DEBRA J. ROBINSON were mailed 
via first-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid to: 
Stephen T. Hard, Esq. 
4141 S. Highland Drive, Suite 220 
Holladay,UT 84124 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL S. ROBINSON, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
DEBRA J. ROBINSON, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Case No. 20090082 
Trial Court No. 074900501 
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
EXHIBIT A- FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIOSN OF LAW, DATED 
DECEMBER 31,2008 
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DEAN C. ANDREASEN (#3981) 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
Telephone (801) 322-2516 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL S. ROBINSON, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
DEBRA J . ROBINSON, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 074900501 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Comm. Michael S. Evans 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly for consideration by the Court 
without hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-4. The parties entered into a 
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement (the "Agreement") to settle all issues of this 
action. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, the parties consented that a Decree of 
Divorce could be entered consistent with the terms of the Agreement. The Court consid-
ered the testimony of Respondent by way of affidavit as to jurisdiction and grounds for this 
divorce. The Court having reviewed the Agreement and other pleadings on file herein, 
does now make and adept the following: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FINDINGS OF FACT 
DIVORCE 
1. The Court finds that the parties shall proceed to obtain a Decree of Divorce 
granting each a divorce from the other as provided for by law dissolving the marriage of the 
parties. 
2. The Court finds that the parties consent that a Decree of Divorce may be 
entered with terms consistent to the terms of the Agreement. 
3. The Court finds that Petitioner is a bona fide and actual resident of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and has been for more than three months prior to the 
commencement of this action. 
4. The Court finds that Petitioner and Respondent are husband and wife, 
respectively, having been married on October 4,1992. 
5. The Court finds that disagreements have ensued between the parties 
concerning their marriage and their future together; meaningful communication between 
the parties has ceased; notwithstanding attempts by the parties to reconcile and resolve 
their differences, the same have been to no avail and have become irreconcilable making 
continuation of the marriage under the circumstances impossible. 
CHILDREN 
6. The Court finds that the parties have no children born as issue of their 
marriage and none are expected. 
ALIMONY AND RELATED PROVISIONS 
7. The Court finds that each party irrevocably waives any claim to past, present 
or future alimony under any circumstance or condition. 
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8. The Court finds that each party shall be responsible to maintain his or her 
own medical and dental insurance coverage and each shall be responsible for his or her 
own uninsured medical and dental costs. 
PROPERTY AND DEBT DISTRIBUTION 
9. The Court finds that prior to and during their marriage, the parties acquired 
certain real and personal property which shall be divided between the parties as described 
below. Prior to and during the marrigge, the parties incurred certain debts and obligations 
which shall be allocated between the parties as described below. The party assuming a 
particular debt or obligation shall indemnify and hold the other party harmless therefrom. 
10. The Court finds that Petitioner shall be awarded the Sewen Springs residence 
and shall assume and pay any debt encumbering the property. 
11. The Court finds that Respondent shall be awarded the ten acre parcel in 
Scenic, Arizona and shall assume and pay any debt encumbering the property. 
12. The Court finds that Respondent shall be awarded the Mayan Palace 
timeshare and shall assume and pay any debt encumbering the property. 
13. The Court finds that Petitioner shall be awarded the parties' interest in the 
condominium in St George, subject to Petitioner assuming and paying any debt 
encumbering the property. Petitioner may continue to own and rent the condominium or, 
alternatively, sell it but Petitioner shall be responsible for all costs of sale. Respondent 
shall be given a credit as described below in the amount of $62,500 for her equity in the 
condominium calculated as one half of the difference between the fair market value of the 
condominium ($250,000) less the current mortgage ($125,000). Rental income from the 
Phoenix Plaza property shall be used to pay all condominium costs and expenses including 
PITI until such time as Petitioner has paid Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza 
property as described below. 
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14. The Court finds that Respondent shall be awarded the parties' interest in the 
condominium in Deer Valley, subject to Respondent assuming and paying any debt 
encumbering the property. Respondent may continue to own and rent the condominium 
or, alternatively, sell it but Respondent shall be responsible for all costs of sale. Petitioner 
shall be given a credit as described below in the amount of $234,000 for his equity in the 
condominium calculated as (i) one half of the difference between the fair market value of 
the condominium ($900,000) less the purchase price ($515,000), plus (ii) $27,870 for the 
down payment paid by Petitioner, plus (iii) $7,500 for the earnest money paid by Petitioner, 
plus (iv) one half of the mortgage pay down in the amount of $6,130, at the time Petitioner 
has paid Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza property. Rental income from 
the Phoenix Plaza property shall be used to pay all condominium costs and expenses 
including PITI until such time as Petitioner has paid Respondent for her interest in the 
Phoenix Plaza property as described below. Rental income shall be recognized as income 
when earned, not deposited. Cash from rental income when earned shall be equally 
divided until such time as Petitioner has paid Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix 
Plaza property as described below. 
15. The Court finds that the disposition of the parties1 interest in the retail center 
in Sandy shall occur as described below. 
A. The retail center shall be immediately listed for sale. The parties shall 
agree to the listing agent, the listing price, any reduction in the listing price, and the 
ultimate terms of sale. In lieu of Petitioner receiving cash from the sale, Petitioner 
shall bo given a credit in the amount of $391,000 ($32,188 + $358,812) for his 
interest in the retail center. This credit reflects and assumes estimated net sales 
proceeds in the amount of $749,812 of which Petitioner shall receive $391,000 and 
Respondent shall receive $358,812. If the net sales proceeds are greater than 
4 
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$749,812, Respondent shall pay Petitioner one half of the difference between the 
actual net sales proceeds and $749,812. If the net sales proceeds are less than 
$749,812, Petitioner shall pay Respondent one half of the difference between the 
actual net sales proceeds and $749,812. 
B. The parties shall jointly mange the retail center until it is sold. 
Respondent shall provide the bookkeeping and accounting services for the retail 
center and provide Petitioner the regular monthly reports. The 2007 real property 
taxes shall be paid from the joint funds of the parties. Any CAM revenue shall be 
equally divided between the parties. 
C. Until such time as the retail center is sold, the parties may agree to 
equally distribute to themselves a portion or all of the cash from the net rental 
income. At the time the retail center is sold, each party shall be awarded one half 
of any cash from the net rental income. 
D. The parties shall agree as to whether any legal action shall be taken 
in an attempt to collect certain unpaid rents and other bad debt. Each party shall 
pay one half of any costs incurred and shall be awarded one half of any monies 
recovered. 
16. The Court finds that the disposition of the parties' interest in the Phoenix 
Plaza property shall occur as described below. 
A. Petitioner shall be awarded the Phoenix Plaza subject to Petitioner 
taking the following actions. 
B. Petitioner shall re-finance the mortgage encumbering the Phoenix 
Plaza and pay Respondent the amount of $1,784,419 for her equity in the Phoenix 
Plaza property calculated as (i) one half of the difference between the stipulated fair 
market value of the Phoenix Plaza property ($7.25M) less the purchase price 
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($4.5M), plus (ii) $891,803 for the down payment paid by Respondent, plus (iii) 
$12,500 for the earnest money paid by Respondent, plus (iv) one half of the 
mortgage pay down in the amount of $67,616 at the time Petitioner has paid 
Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza property, plus (v) $62,500 for the 
St. George condominium credit, less (vi) $234,000 for the Deer Valley condominium 
credit, less (vii) $391,000 for the Sandy retail center credit. If the re-financing does 
not occur within one hundred twenty (120) days of the date the parties signed the 
this Agreement, Petitioner shall pay Respondent interest at the rate of eight percent 
(8%) from one hundred and twenty (120) days after the parties sign this Agreement. 
Petitioner shall file the loan refinance application within 15 days of the date of this 
Agreement. Respondent shall assist Petitioner in preparing and filing the loan 
refinance application. 
C. The parties shall jointly manage the Phoenix Plaza until the time the 
re-financing occurs, Respondent shall provide the bookkeeping and accounting 
services for the Phoenix Plaza and provide Petitioner the regular monthly reports. 
D. Until Respondent is paid her equity in the Phoenix Plaza, (1) the net 
rental income shall be used to pay, as necessary, the operating costs of the Phoenix 
Plaza and the other properties as described above and (2) the parties may agree 
to equally distribute to themselves a portion or all of the cash from the net rental 
income. At the time Respondent is paid her equity in the Phoenix Plaza, each party 
shall be awarded one half of any cash from the net rental income. 
E. Tenants of the Phoenix Plaza owe certain common area maintenance 
fees ("CAM Fees") for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. Any CAM Fees collected 
relative to time periods prior to the time Petitioner re-finances the mortgage on the 
Phoenix Plaza shall be equally divided between the parties. The parties shall agree 
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to any collection costs including attorney fees to be incurred in an attempt to collect 
the CAM Fees. 
F. Each party shall pay one half of all costs and expenses including any 
prepayment penalty associated with the payoff of any existing mortgage or 
encumbrance or the origination of any new mortgage or encumbrance relative to the 
re-financing of the Phoenix Plaza debt. 
17. The Court finds that the disposition of the parties' interest in the parking lot 
parcel next to the Phoenix Plaza shall occur as described below. 
A. Petitioner shall be awarded the parking lot property subject to 
Petitioner taking the following actions. 
B. At the time of and as a part of the re-financing relative to the mortgage 
encumbering the Phoenix Plaza, Petitioner shall pay Respondent the amount of 
$105,777 which is equal to one half of the difference between (1) $425,000 
(representing the stipulated fair market value of the parking lot parcel) less (2) the 
unpaid principal amount of the mortgage in the amount of $213,446 on the parking 
lot parcel at the time of the re-financing of the Phoenix Plaza mortgage. This 
amount may be adjusted as required by each party paying one half of the amount 
to settle or otherwise resolve the disputed claim of Keith Funk for certain asphalt 
services provided relative to the parking lot parcel. In the event the amount 
necessary to resolve the disputed claim of Keith Funk has not been determined by 
the time of the re-financing occurs, such amount shall not be taken into 
consideration and each party shall thereafter pay one half of the amount necessary 
to resolve the disputed claim. 
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18. The Court finds that Petitioner shall be awarded the Ford Excursion vehicle 
and the BMW motorcycle. Petitioner shall assume and pay the debt encumbering the Ford 
Excursion vehicle. There is no debt encumbering the BMW motorcycle. 
19. The Court finds that Respondent shall be awarded the Chevrolet Avalanche 
and Toyota Matrix vehicles. Respondent shall assume and pay the debt encumbering the 
Chevrolet Avalanche vehicle. There is no debt encumbering the Toyota Matrix vehicle. 
20. The Court finds that Petitioner shall be awarded the Cessna 210 airplane. 
There is no debt encumbering the airplane. On the first closing to occur of either the sale 
of the Sandy retail center or the refinancing of the Phoenix Plaza property, Petitioner shall 
pay Respondent $22,500 from his share of the net sales proceeds in consideration of 
Petitioner being awarded the airplane. 
21. The Court finds that Respondent shall be awarded the aluminum boat and 
motor. The interest of the parties in the sailboat shall be awarded to Matthew Larson. 
22. The Court finds that Petitioner shall be awarded his retirement accounts in 
the Cardiomed Profit Sharing Plan. Petitioner represents that no contributions have been 
made to his account in the Cardiomed Profit Sharing Plan during the term of the marriage. 
Petitioner shall be awarded his IRA accounts. 
23. The Court finds that Respondent shall be awarded her 401 (k) retirement 
accounts. Respondent shall be awarded her IRA accounts. 
24. The Court finds that each party shall be awarded one half of any Utah 
Education Savings Plan accounts in either parties' name. 
25. The Court finds that any bank account maintained jointly by the parties for 
their personal use or used in conjunction with a real property shall be equally divided 
between the parties at the time the account is closed, the property is sold, or Respondent 
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is paid out her equity in the property. Petitioner shall be awarded the Rawkin Horse bank 
account and the cash in Petitioner's possession. 
26. The Court finds that each party shall be awarded his or her individual 
checking and savings accounts. 
27. The Court finds that the parties have no life insurance policy that has a cash 
surrender value. 
28. The Court finds that each party shall be awarded his or her clothing, jewelry, 
sporting equipment, musical instruments, and personal effects. 
29. The Court finds that each party shall be awarded as his or her separate 
property, property acquired prior to the marriage, property acquired by gift, devise or 
inheritance, or as a gift from the other party during the marriage 
30. The Court finds that Petitioner shall be awarded the furniture, furnishings and 
other personal property located in the real properties awarded to him except as described 
in Exhibit A attached, which items shall be awarded to Respondent. Respondent shall be 
awarded the furniture, furnishings and other personal property located in the real properties 
awarded to her except as described in Exhibit B attached, which items shall be awarded 
to Petitioner. Respondent may store her personal property at the Seven Springs residence 
until thirty days after the date the Agreement was signed by the parties. The parties shall 
clearly identify in a list the property that is being stored. Respondent may store her grand 
piano at the Seven Springs residence for an indefinite period of time provided that 
Respondent shall remove the grand piano within 60 days of demand for such from 
Petitioner. 
31. The Court finds that each party shall be awarded one half of any marital 
property not specifically provided for in the Agreement. 
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32. The Court finds that each party shall assume and pay one half of any marital 
debt or obligation not specifically provided for in the Agreement. 
33. The Court finds that each party shall assume and pay his or her debts and 
obligations incurred since the time of the separation of the parties, and indemnify and hold 
the other party harmless therefrom. 
TAX PROVISIONS 
34. The Court finds that in the event any income tax return of the parties filed on 
a married filing joint basis is audited, the parties shall be equally liable for any tax, penalty 
or interest assessed or shall be equally entitled to any refund. The parties shall equally pay 
one half of the excise sales and lodging taxes due to the State of Utah relative to the rental 
of the Deer Valley condominium. 
35. The Court finds that the parties shall file federal and state income tax returns 
on a married filing joint basis for the year 2007. Each party shall be awarded one half of 
any refund or each party shall pay one half of any taxes, penalties or interest due on the 
2007 returns with the exception that the incremental taxes owed relative to retirement 
distributions taken by Petitioner during 2007 shall be paid solely by Petitioner from his 
separate funds. Each party shall be awarded one half of any alternative minimum tax credit 
carryforward from the 2007 federal income tax return. 
36. The Court finds that Petitioner shall be entitled to any tax deduction relative 
to the Seven Springs residence accruing from January 1, 2008. Respondent shall be 
entitled to any tax deduction relative to the Scenic, Arizona property or the Mayan Palace 
timeshare accruing from January 1, 2008. 
37. The Court finds that each party shall report one half of any net income or net 
loss relative to the St. George condominium from January 1, 2008 until Respondent is paid 
her equity in the Phoenix Plaza property. 
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38. The Court finds that each party shall report one half of any net income or net 
loss relative to the Deer Valley condominium from January 1,2008 until Respondent is paid 
her equity in the Phoenix Plaza property. 
39. The Court finds that each party shall report one half of any net income or net 
loss relative to the Sandy retail center from January 1, 2008 until the time of sale. 
Respondent shall elect to either realize the gain on the sale of the property or enter into a 
§ 1031 exchange transaction since Respondent has assumed the tax basis in the property 
by granting Petitioner a credit for his interest. 
40. The Court finds that each party shall report one half of any net income or net 
loss relative to the Phoenix Plaza property from January 1,2008 until Respondent is paid 
her equity in the property. 
41. The Court finds that each party shall be awarded and entitled to claim one 
half of any quarterly installment payment made for federal or state income taxes prior to 
Petitioner re-financing the mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza property and paying Respondent 
her equity in the property as described above. 
42. The Court finds that Petitioner shall be liable for any income tax or penalty 
relative to distributions he has taken from his retirement during 2007 at the parties' highest 
marginal tax rate. 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
43. The Court finds that the parties shall execute such documents as may be 
necessary to transfer the property as awarded by the Court to the party entitled thereto. 
44. The Court finds that each party shall pay his or her attorney fees and costs 
individually incurred in this action. 
45. The Court finds that Respondent may have her previous surname of Johnson 
restored to her if she so desires. 
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46. The Court finds that a restraining order shall be entered enjoining each party 
from harassing, annoying or bothering the other party or any family member of the other 
party. 
47. The Court finds that each party has made a full and fair disclosure to the 
other of his or her assets, financial condition and worth, and each party has had the 
opportunity to inspect the other's records as they relate to the subject matter hereof and 
is satisfied by the disclosures of the other party and knowingly and willingly waives any 
further disclosures. 
48. The Court finds that the parties also represent that they have made no 
assignment, transfer, or distribution of any funds or property to any third party except in the 
course of typical and reasonable living and business expenses. 
49. The Court finds that the parties represent that prior to the execution of the 
Agreement they have each reviewed and discussed its terms with their respective counsel, 
if deemed necessary, and that the same represents a fair and equitable distribution of the 
assets acquired and liabilities incurred by the parties. 
50. The Court finds that in the event of a dispute between the parties as to the 
interpretation of a term of the Agreement, the parties shall mediate the issue before either 
party may initiate court action. Each party shall pay one half of the mediator's fee. 
51. The Court finds that the file in this action shall be classified as private. 
52. The Court finds that the prevailing party to an action for breach of a term of 
the Agreement shall be entitled to his or her attorneys fees and costs. 
53. The Court finds that each party shall use his or her best efforts to effectuate 
the refinancing of the existing mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza property and shall cooperate 
and provide necessary documentation and signatures on a timely basis. 
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54. The Court finds that until the refinancing of the mortgage on the Phoenix 
Plaza property occurs, the parties shall maintain the status quo on the payment of their 
expenses and the receipt of funds. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now concludes as follows: 
1. That this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and the 
parties to this action. 
2. That Petitioner is entitled to be awarded a Decree of Divorce from 
Respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences and that such should become final 
upon its entry as provided by law. 
3. That the Agreement of the parties settling all issues in this action, as set forth 
in the Findings of Fact, is equitable and should be incorporated into the Decree of Divorce. 
DATED this *l day of Jeraary, 2008. 
APPROVED this day of 
,2007 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
MELISSA M. BEAN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this r > day of November, 2007,1 hereby caused to be served on the 
Petitioner a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW by having the same delivered by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, 
to: 
Kenneth A. Okazaki, Esq. 
Melissa Bean, Esq. 
Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main Street, #1500 
P.O. Box45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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EXHIBIT A 
ITEMS DEBRA WANTS FROM SANDY RESIDENCE 
Tempurpedic Bed 
- Marble-Buck^a Jo ltf>tul»r < fy^ ™ ^ " 
Washer & Dryer 
Stainless Steel Barbeque 
New Chase Lounges and Umbrella around pool 
- Rat-stxeerHft-bedroom t M kh\ ^ fcft^K 
-tsatter farnrfijnfe and fijg in downstairs family room 
Treadmill h rth*~ &$. Ut&^ 
Purchases during travel equally divided 
Photographs divided or copied - cost divided equally. 
Equally divide sheet music 
Freezer in garage 
**'*<- - H/lL--^L 
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